Social goods are goods that grant value not only to their owners but also to the owners' surroundings, be it their families, friends or o ce mates. The bene t a non-owner derives from the good is a ected by many factors, including the type of the good, its availability, and the social status of the non-owner. Depending on the magnitude of the bene t and on the price of the good, a potential buyer might stay away from purchasing the good, hoping to free ride on others' purchases. A revenue-maximizing seller who sells social goods must take these considerations into account when setting prices for the good. The literature on optimal pricing has advanced considerably over the last decade, but little is known about optimal pricing schemes for selling social goods. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of revenue-maximizing pricing schemes for social goods: we introduce a Bayesian model for this scenario, and devise nearly-optimal pricing schemes for various types of externalities, both for simultaneous sales and for sequential sales.
on the magnitude of the bene t and on the price of the good, a potential buyer might stay away from purchasing the good, hoping to free ride on others' purchases. A revenue-maximizing seller who sells social goods must take these considerations into account when setting prices for the good. The literature on optimal pricing has advanced considerably over the last decade, but little is known about optimal pricing schemes for selling social goods. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of revenue-maximizing pricing schemes for social goods: we introduce a Bayesian model for this scenario, and devise nearly-optimal pricing schemes for various types of externalities, both for simultaneous sales and for sequential sales.
To study this problem, we consider a setting with a single type of good, of unlimited supply, and a set of n agents; each agent i ∈ [n] has a non-negative valuation i for purchasing the good, drawn independently from a distribution F i . We denote the product distribution by F = × i ∈[n] F i . An agent i who purchases the good derives value i from it.
If an agent does not purchase the good, but the good is purchased by others, then this agent derives only a fraction of her value, depending on the set of agents and the type of externality the good exhibits on the agent. This type of externality is captured in our model by an externality function
, where x i (S) denotes the fraction of i an agent i derives when the good is purchased by the set of agents S. We assume that x i is publicly known (as it captures the agent's externalities), monotonically nondecreasing and normalized; i.e., for every T ⊆ S,
We consider three structures of the function x i , corresponding to three types of externalities of social goods. Therefore, x i (S) = 1 if and only if S ∅. This model captures goods that are non-excludable, such as a co ee machine in a shared o ce. A special case of this scenario, where valuations are independently and identically distributed, has been studied in [1] . (b) Status-based externalities: in this scenario, agent i's "social status" is captured by some discount factor w i ∈ [0, 1], which corresponds to the fraction of the value agent i derives from a good when purchased by another party. This model captures settings that exhibit asymmetry with respect to the bene t di erent agents derive from goods they do not own (e.g., a fast food restaurant might bene t from any tra c in the shopping mall, whereas more specialized stores may bene t from as campaigns that draw customers interested in a similar kind of products). (c) Availability-based externalities: in this scenario, the availability of a good increases as more agents purchase a good, and therefore, an agent derives a larger fraction of her value as more agents purchase a good. This is captured by a monotonically non-decreasing function w : {0, . . . , n − 1} → [0, 1] with w(0) = 0. Examples of such scenarios include objects that are often shared by neighbors (e.g., snow blowers, lawn mowers), o ce supplies, etc.
We provide the following results: (i) We devise poly-time pricing schemes for settings with full externalities that give a constant factor approximation to the optimal pricing scheme, for both simultaneous and sequential sales. Moreover, these results can be achieved using a non-discriminatory price, despite asymmetry among buyers.
(ii) We devise poly-time pricing schemes for settings with statusbased externalities that give a constant factor approximation to the optimal pricing scheme, for both simultaneous and sequential sales. (iii) We devise a poly-time pricing scheme for sequential sales with availability-based externalities, that gives a logarithmic factor approximation to the optimal pricing scheme.
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